

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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22 March 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

(Romania)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. L. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALIETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. C. IJEWERE
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mrs. H. SKOWRONSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROLANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. I. VIRGIN
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. L. D. WEILER
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and fiftieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As previously decided (ENDC/PV.244, p.4), we shall begin this meeting by continuing the discussion on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The delegation of the United States welcomes the resumption of our discussion on non-proliferation. We are resuming this discussion today as a result of action taken by this Committee at its meeting on 1 March of this year, on the recommendation of the co-Chairmen that we do so.

General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161), adopted last autumn, calls upon this Conference to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with a view to negotiating a treaty to prevent such proliferation. As we resume our deliberations on this subject today, I am sure we all feel the sense of urgency expressed in this resolution and a sense of obligation to negotiate the treaty for which it calls.

When we last discussed the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, many delegations expressed the view that when we returned to the discussion of this subject it would be appropriate to examine, article by article, the two draft treaties (ENDC/152, 164) that lie on the table. The representative of the Soviet Union, in his intervention on 3 March (ENDC/PV.245, p.46), stated that he had no objection to this method of proceeding.

The delegation of the United States believes that it might be helpful to compare the articles of the two draft treaties. But it feels that, as this process begins, the Conference should have on the table for consideration and study certain important amendments which we are now introducing to the United States draft treaty. These amendments have been developed by the United States in large part as a result of the deliberations of this Conference. We are offering them because we believe that they will advance the negotiation of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. By so doing we are making it clear that our position in negotiating an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not inflexible.

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The United States delegation hopes that other delegations will be equally flexible. It is for the purpose of presenting these amendments that the United States has asked for the privilege of speaking first today. The amendments are before the Committee in document ENDC/152/Add.1, dated 21 March 1966.

The United States draft amendments deal directly with the principal threat of our time --- the threat that the danger of nuclear war can be increased by an increase in the number of power centres that can start such a war. The United States draft strikes at the heart of this threat by prohibiting any increase -- even by one -- in the number of power centres that have the right or ability to fire a nuclear weapon.

What we must do, if we are to achieve the basic objective of our non-proliferation negotiations, is to limit the number of Powers that will be in a position to unleash nuclear weapons. There are two ways by which a non-nuclear weapon State could obtain this power. One would be by obtaining from an existing nuclear weapon State the right or ability to use these weapons. Under the United States amendments this route is barred by the precise definition of "control" which I am about to describe. The other way in which a non-nuclear weapon State could obtain this power would be by manufacturing nuclear weapons itself. This route we have also barred, as I shall indicate later, by article I paragraph 2 and by article II paragraphs 1 and 2 of the amendments.

One of the key elements in the United States amendments is the definition of "control of nuclear weapons" in terms of the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. "Control" was not defined explicitly in the original United States draft, although its meaning was clearly implied by the prohibition of any action to increase the number of entities with independent power to use nuclear weapons.

The discussions in this Conference, and further deliberation on the question, led the United States to the conclusion that the definition of "control" is too central to the problem of non-proliferation to be left to implication. We have therefore given it an exact definition. Before quoting article IV (c) of the United States amendments, I should like to say this. It may seem illogical in describing amendments to begin with the last article of those amendments. However, as the representatives will see, the last article consists of definitions. This first appearance of lack of logic will therefore, I think, give way to a recognition that it is best first to define the terms one is talking about and then to indicate how those terms are used in the substantive amendments. Article IV (c) reads:

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"'Control' means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon State." (ENDC/152/Add.1, p.2)

I should emphasize that the decision of the nuclear weapon State would have to be explicit; it would have to be concurrent in time with the event; it could not be in the form of a general approval given in advance. Moreover, it is essential to keep in mind that under this definition control relates not merely to the right but also to the ability to fire nuclear weapons.

In considering the significance of this definition of control, this Conference should also have in mind the intentions of the United States with respect to possible common nuclear defence arrangements within alliance structures. I have already read, at the meeting on 3 March (ENDC/PV.245, p.32), testimony from the Secretary of State of the United States before our Congress dealing with possible NATO nuclear arrangements. I should like to add here that, while he was testifying, he was asked whether any plans being discussed in NATO contemplated that the United States would give up its veto over the use of United States weapons. Here is his reply:

"We would have to insist ... that the United States be a necessary party to a decision to use nuclear weapons. Because the vast arsenals of the United States are so heavily involved in that decision, we must be present for that decision and must ourselves agree to a decision taken."

Our Secretary of Defense was asked the same question. He was equally explicit. Here is his reply:

"We have no plan to dilute our veto in any way and our allies are not asking us for a dilution of that veto."

These clear statements of United States intentions and the clear definition of "control" in the United States draft indicate that the United States draft would not permit a non-nuclear weapon State to have any relationship to nuclear weapons which would give it the right or ability to fire such weapons on its own. Furthermore, under provisions of the United States amendments that I shall be discussing later, a nuclear weapon State is prohibited from allowing a non-nuclear weapon State to have a relationship to nuclear weapons which would permit the non-nuclear weapon State to obtain manufacturing or design information.

With these clear prohibitions of the United States draft in mind, we do the cause of non-proliferation a disservice if we permit ourselves to be diverted into

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theoretical discussions about what is meant by "access" to nuclear weapons. Here we should note in passing that United Nations resolution 2028 (XII) does not entangle itself in this vague concept of "access". We do the cause of non-proliferation even less service if we let ourselves be drawn into a debate on whether certain collective defence arrangements might increase the influence within an alliance of a non-nuclear weapon State. This would indeed be a fruitless expenditure of our efforts, particularly when those attacking these collective defence arrangements concede that they do not involve the acquisition of any independent ability to fire nuclear weapons.

We have a difficult enough task ahead of us in negotiating a non-proliferation agreement if we concentrate -- as we should and we must -- on the central issues. We should therefore reject diversions which may render a difficult task impossible. If we but concentrate on our main task, we shall, despite the difficulties which now face us, be able to accomplish our objective: the negotiation of an agreement which ensures that the number of power centres which have the right or ability to start a nuclear war will not be increased -- not even by one.

I hope I have made clear the views of the United States on the importance of the definition of "control". With this in mind, I should like to explain the other portions of our new amendments.

First, as representatives may have already gathered from my remarks, we have adopted in our amendments the concept of "nuclear weapon State" and "non-nuclear weapon State". This is a concept which I believe was first mentioned by the representative of India during our last session (ENDC/PV.223). These terms "nuclear weapon State" and "non-nuclear weapon State" are formally noted in article IV subparagraphs (a,b). This is the article dealing with definitions. But these terms, as they are defined, appear throughout articles I and II of the amendments.

As Mr. Trivedi has pointed out, there are States with important programmes for peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have wisely chosen to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Our original draft was therefore not accurate in defining such States as "non-nuclear". We believe that our amendments, by making the distinction between "nuclear weapon States" and "non-nuclear weapon States", better describe the actual problem with which we are dealing -- the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am happy to note that some recent speakers in the Committee already seem to have adopted this concept, following

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the lead which the representative of India gave us at the last session. The adoption of this terminology may help to stop the talk of a "nuclear club". This phrase has often been used loosely in discussing the proliferation problem. I submit that it is a phrase which, with its implications of a high table or superior coterie, is quite inconsistent with the objectives of our work here.

Let me now draw attention to our new article I and the obligations it establishes for nuclear weapon States. Under the first paragraph of this new article, the nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty undertake --

"Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear weapon States." (ENDC/152/Add.1)

The first portion of this new language maintains the prohibition in our prior draft against transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear weapon State. The second portion forbids also the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of any association of non-nuclear weapon States.

A close analysis of the language in article I of the original United States draft treaty (ENDC/152) dated 17 August 1965, showed that it might have been interpreted as permitting the creation of a new nuclear entity composed entirely of non-nuclear weapon States, in the event that a pre-existing nuclear weapon State had previously unilaterally disarmed itself of nuclear weapons. This result was not intended; but to remove any doubt the amendment makes explicit the intent not to transfer control of nuclear weapons, either to a single non-nuclear weapon State or to several such States acting together.

Paragraph 2 of our new article I would oblige the nuclear weapon States --

"Not to provide to any non-nuclear weapon State or association of such States

- (a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or
- (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons." (ENDC/152/Add.1)

As representatives will realize, in subparagraph (a) of this new formulation we have adopted to some extent provisions contained in the Soviet articles I and II (ENDC/164, pp.4, 5) concerning preparations for manufacture and concerning testing of nuclear weapons. Here we have also sought to take into account the wise observation

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of the representative of Sweden at our meeting of 24 February when she pointed out that there was not one but a chain of decisions leading up to the final action of "manufacture" of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.243, p.12).

In paragraph 2 (b) of our new article I we have adopted the concept of a prohibition against encouraging or inducing a non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own weapons. This idea of a prohibition against encouragement or inducement adopts a concept that had its origin in article I, paragraph 2 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (ENDC/100/Rev.1). This concept would be equally suitable in the treaty we are now considering.

I have already indicated to this Conference why I think that the concept of access is not productive of progress in our work here. But at this stage I should also point out that any legitimate concerns in this regard should be taken care of by the amendment that I am now discussing and the comparable provisions of article II. The obligations of nuclear weapon States and the corresponding obligations of non-nuclear weapon States in these two amendments -- articles I and II -- are, so to speak, mirror images of one another. The amendments to article I make it perfectly clear that the nuclear weapon States cannot do anything that would assist the non-nuclear weapon States in manufacturing nuclear weapons, in preparing for their manufacture or in testing them. They go even further and commit the nuclear weapon States not to do anything which will encourage or induce the non-nuclear weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire their own nuclear weapons.

This commitment must be evaluated in the light of the corresponding commitment in article II, under which in its paragraph 1 the non-nuclear weapon States agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and in paragraph 2 not to accept assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparation for such manufacture or in testing nuclear weapons, or even to accept encouragement or inducement to acquire nuclear weapons otherwise. As I shall make clear in my discussion of paragraph 4 of articles I and II respectively, these solemn commitments apply to units or personnel of a non-nuclear weapon State which are under the command of a military alliance.

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I should now like to call attention to paragraph 3 of our new article I, which, in addition to previous prohibitions, obliges nuclear weapon States --

"Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons."

This provision, together with the definition of control which I described earlier, completes the embodiment in treaty language of our Government's position that there should be no increase -- not even by one -- in the centres of nuclear power which have the right or ability to start a nuclear war.

This provision would bar any transfer of control of nuclear weapons to any association of States -- that is, it would prohibit the granting to any such association of the right or ability to fire a nuclear weapon without the explicit concurrent decision of a nuclear weapon State -- unless one of the members of the association was a nuclear weapon State and that member gave up its entire nuclear arsenal to the association. Since this would not involve any increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers, no proliferation would result.

This section of the United States amendments is also related to discussions about possible common nuclear defence arrangements within alliance structures. This is a subject on which there has been a great deal of misunderstanding and some misstatements. It is for that reason that I should like to develop the implications of this section somewhat further.

I should like to do so by pointing out that, where a nuclear weapon State retains a veto over any use of nuclear weapons, there is no problem of transfer of control. That is because no additional State and no association of States gains the right or ability to take, on its own, a decision to use nuclear weapons. Neither would have the ability to start a nuclear war. That terrible decision remains in the hands of the existing nuclear weapon States, and no question of transfer of control even arises.

In this connexion, the testimony of the Secretaries of State and Defense of the United States concerning the intentions of the United States with respect to proposed nuclear arrangements within NATO should make it quite clear that no one in NATO has been talking about any arrangements which would involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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Paragraph 4 of our new article I also constitutes an important addition to our draft. It commits the nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty --

"Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance."

Both the original United States draft (ENDC/152) and the Soviet draft (ENDC/164) reflect a concern with preventing the possibility of a State doing indirectly, in conjunction with one or several other States, what it could not do directly. Our new article I, paragraph 4, represents a refinement of our previous formulation and, in addition, borrows from the formulations in all three paragraphs of the Soviet article I. We believe this new paragraph 4 to be more concise and more comprehensive than either our own previous formulation or the Soviet draft.

I shall not go further today in describing our new article II, which sets forth the obligations of non-nuclear weapon States. The important point about article II is that it corresponds in reciprocal fashion to -- or, as I said earlier, it is a mirror image of -- the obligations required of the nuclear weapon States in article I. Nor do I intend today to discuss the language of other articles of the treaty to which we have not proposed amendments. We shall deal with these other articles later, as our discussion progresses.

I have already dealt with three subparagraphs of our new article IV. In particular, I have already noted the precise definition of "control" contained in subparagraph (c) of that article. I would emphasize once again our strong belief that this definition, taken in conjunction with our new articles I and II, represents the most precise prohibitions yet formulated against proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It remains for me to indicate the last element in our new amendments, an element which in our view is of considerable importance. I refer to the bracketed portion in our new article IV (d), which indicates that a definition of "nuclear weapon" is to be supplied at that point. We are convinced of the need for such a definition, but believe that it is not essential at this point in our negotiations and can be formulated at an appropriate technical level at the appropriate time. We do think it advisable at this time to call the Committee's attention to this question.

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We believe that these new United States amendments reflect better than our previous draft -- and, with all due respect, better than the present Soviet draft -- the requirements for a just, precise and effective treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We submit these amendments as evidence of our deep desire to reach agreement on this all-important question. We seek to move our negotiations forward. We hope the Soviet response will be in the same spirit, so that we may look forward to a constructive period of deliberations.

I shall not try to anticipate here and now the reaction of the Soviet Government to these amendments. If the Soviet Government is truly concerned about preventing proliferation, direct or indirect, and is not more interested in seeking to interfere with justifiable and proper defence arrangements among allies, then it should recognize that we have provided in this new language the basis for a foolproof non-proliferation treaty that can be negotiated and implemented before it is too late.

We believe that we have today taken a further step towards agreement. Certainly that is our intention. We believe that the Soviet Government should recognize this intention and in our further discussions should respond to this effort in a constructive way. The path to agreement may not be wide or smooth, but it is now open if men of common cause and of good will are prepared to make use of it.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): As I listened to the speech of the United States representative there came into my mind some words of the great French writer Henri de Montherlant. In "The Civil War", his play about the death of Caesar, Cato tells Pompeius that "The best evidence of greatness is restraint in the use of power". In my view the record of the United States -- and it was reflected again in the words of Mr. Fisher today -- has been one of restraint in the use of the greatest military power that has ever been placed in the hands of a sovereign nation State, the power of nuclear weapons. And the record of the Soviet Union has been hardly less impressive. It is because those two great nations have realized the terrible implications of the power they wield that the world has so far been spared the unimaginable horror of a nuclear war. But we must now ask ourselves seriously whether we can always rely upon this evidence of greatness, especially if the power of nuclear weapons spreads beyond its present frontiers.

Before I come to the substance of my remarks on this subject, I should like to say a word about general and complete disarmament, especially as I did not, for

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various reasons, intervene in last week's discussion. I was nevertheless glad of the opportunity to listen to the contributions made by the speakers at last Thursday's meeting (ENDC/PV.249). I shall study with care these statements, as well as the previous speeches on the subject which I missed through being away.

We must never lose sight of general and complete disarmament as our ultimate goal. Though it is a subject to which we all give a great deal of thought now as in the past, it is not one to which there can be any quick or easy solution: there is no such thing as "instant disarmament". I am sure that we were right to give priority last summer, and that we are right to continue to give priority now, to halting the spread of nuclear weapons. We must be realists. If we cannot surmount the low hurdles -- and there are moments when even these seem formidable enough -- what hope is there of successfully tackling the high ones? I am sure all of us view collateral measures as steps toward general and complete disarmament. We have certainly gone on record to this effect both here and in New York. But they are important and urgent in themselves, and we must now give them our full attention if we are to achieve success.

Let me, then, turn to the matter which I believe to be most urgent of all, non-proliferation. I should like to take up the threads by examining certain questions raised in two speeches made on 3 March when the Committee broke off the discussion of this subject. Unfortunately I was not able to be here myself, but I see from the record (ENDC/PV.245, pp.39 et seq.) that the Soviet representative made some forceful remarks about my speech of 1 March (ENDC/PV.244, p.11) in which I was quoting from an earlier speech of his (ENDC/PV.241, pp.27, 33). I should like to remove any misunderstanding about what I said then.

Before dealing with the specific issues, I should like to provide a framework for what I have to say by discussing for a moment the whole concept of the military alliance; because in my view many of the problems in international relations generally -- and more specifically in our arms control and disarmament negotiations here -- spring from confused thinking about the purpose and relevance of military alliances. The military alliance is basically a system of collective defence against a military threat. So long as groups of countries with similar political systems and common interests are threatened, or believe themselves to be threatened, by someone else, these alliances will exist. And as long as they exist there will be

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co-operation and consultation among the governments that belong to them. That is what a military alliance is for. When an alliance is made up of some countries that have nuclear weapons and others that do not, this consultation is bound to take some account of the circumstances and contingencies in which the nuclear weapons of the alliance might be used.

That is not to say we can accept military alliances as a permanent and unchangeable feature of the international scene. Military alliances have absolutely no value or relevance in isolation from the threat that originally brought them into being. The need for alliances must be constantly reviewed and reassessed: the forms, modalities and military arrangements within alliances must not be allowed to assume a life of their own. And if it can ever be conclusively demonstrated that the threat which brought an alliance into being has disappeared, then it would be foolish and pointless to perpetuate the alliance itself as though the very idea of collective defence had some merit of its own.

In my view it is clear that the danger of war in Europe has substantially receded in recent years. If we are to resolve the new problems likely to threaten the peace, prosperity and stability of the world in the 1970's and 1980's, we must first drag ourselves free from the obsolete assumptions and inflexible mental processes of the cold war. So far as my country is concerned, we would infinitely prefer to have an atmosphere of trust and co-operation between the West and the countries of Eastern Europe than any number of powerful military alliances. It is, indeed, only in a climate of détente and mutual confidence that the political problems which lie at the heart of Europe will ever be resolved.

This division of Europe into two armed camps is a grotesque aberration of history; but it is a reflection of the greater division between the communist countries and the West -- a conflict that must be resolved if the dangers of the next twenty years are to be effectively met. This is the deeper significance of the agreements on arms control and disarmament that we are trying to negotiate here. They would be a sign that we had found some common ground between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other; they would in effect be the beginning of a new relationship to take the place of the mistrust and suspicion that characterizes the whole wretched apparatus of the cold war.

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But I ask the representatives of the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe to accept that, so long as NATO and the Warsaw Pact continue to exist in confrontation with each other, the members of the Western alliance at least will want to continue to ensure that their defences are strong. And here perhaps I might be allowed to comment briefly on a passage in the speech of the representative of Poland on 1 March. He said:

"Of course, nuclear sharing is less than possession of nuclear weapons with the sovereign right to use them. But in many cases it may constitute a very important element of implementation of national policies. It may increase the influence of a State among its allies."

(ENDC/TV.244, p.20)

Later on, speaking of the question of "access", he said:

"... nuclear sharing gives its recipients access to wider military and political opportunities. As for my country, it has sufficient reasons to object to any arrangements which would give certain States access to wider military and political opportunities." (ibid., p.21)

I understand that this may be a legitimate element in the foreign policy of Poland and perhaps the other countries of Eastern Europe; but I think we ought not to be so imprecise in our thinking as to suppose that it has anything at all to do with the spread of nuclear weapons. If the aim of the communist countries is to detach the Federal Republic of Germany from the Western alliance, then they should say so without equivocation, and we should know what answer to give. If they are really suggesting that their price for a non-proliferation treaty is the end of all political consultation among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then they must know that these terms are unacceptable.

But, to return to the Soviet representative's remarks of 3 March, the point I was trying to make in commenting on his earlier speech was that we shall get into considerable difficulties here if we do not use precise terminology in discussing non-proliferation. Let me try to put this point another way. All of us may regret, as I have just suggested, the existence of the situation which makes the North Atlantic and Warsaw alliances necessary. They are both associations of nuclear and non-nuclear States. If we try to approach the problem of non-proliferation by using words like "access" we shall be in danger of reaching a position where the alliances themselves constitute proliferation -- and there is no hope at all for a treaty along that road.

What, then, can we use as a more precise criterion?

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Let us take another look at the Western formulation. States which possess nuclear weapons look upon them as a deterrent against a war that is too terrible to contemplate. But a nuclear weapon -- forgive me if I state the obvious -- is no danger to anyone unless it can be fired; and to fire it you must have control of it. "Control" is a word that is clearly and explicitly defined by Western delegations: it has been so defined a dozen times during the present session. The revised draft which the United States representative has just submitted (ENDC/152/Add.1) includes this definition in its article IV. I propose to say more about this revised draft in a moment. At this point I merely wish to suggest that the concept of "control" provides an absolutely unmistakable dividing line, one which is basic to the whole purpose of a non-proliferation treaty.

In his statement on 3 March the Soviet representative further said:

"... Lord Chalfont's attempt to reduce the substance of the differences to arguments about different interpretations of the concept of military alliances does not stand up to criticism." (ENDC/PV.245, p.42)

I do not accept this as an accurate summary of the remarks to which Mr. Tsarapkin was referring. At the same time I think he dismisses this question of alliances too easily, and I hope the Committee will bear with me if I take a few minutes now to examine another aspect of this question of the military alliance and its impact on our negotiations.

The United Kingdom delegation has pointed out many times before that there are important elements of asymmetry in the relation between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance. The Soviet delegation often finds it convenient to overlook these and to argue as if they did not exist. The basic lack of symmetry between the two alliances arises from the fact that, whereas the territory of the most powerful member of the Warsaw Pact itself borders on the generally-accepted zone of confrontation in central Europe, the most powerful member of NATO is three or four thousand miles away. The European allies of the Soviet Union are on its doorstep; the European allies of the United States are divided from it by an ocean. And from this simple geographical fact a number of simple conclusions follow. In the first place, so long as both alliances have at their disposal nuclear weapons

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of long, medium and short range, the Western alliance cannot keep all these weapons on the territory of the United States; some will have to be in Europe.

It follows in turn from this that those governments on whose territory the alliance is obliged to station its means of defence must be consulted about the conditions in which, and the purposes for which, these weapons are to be maintained. In an alliance consisting of sovereign and equal States, there is obviously no other alternative. Indeed, these characteristics of the Atlantic alliance are not new, they are not something which we have suddenly proposed to introduce; they exist already. The inevitable deployment of weapons outside the United States and the resulting consultative machinery exist today. This is not proliferation -- I have never heard any suggestion that it is --, and I do not see why the Soviet representative should assume that any modification of the existing arrangements would necessarily result in proliferation.

Now I have no doubt that it would be perfectly possible for the Warsaw Pact to keep all its nuclear weapons inside the Soviet frontier. After all, even if it did, the nearest piece of Soviet territory on which nuclear weapons could be stationed would be only some 400 miles from the nearest piece of West German territory and only 1,000 miles from the farthest point in the British Isles. On the other hand, the distance from the nearest point in the United States to the nearest location of any one of its Western European allies is no less than 2,500 miles. Thus no comparison is possible between the degree of geographical concentration of weapons available to the Soviet Union and that available to the Western alliance. The Soviet Union, I suggest, cannot take credit for the geographical location of its allies and assume that everyone else is able to base his calculations on continuous inner lines of defence.

There are, of course, points of similarity between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliance, and perhaps I may be forgiven if I illustrate this point from the experience of a student taking his final examinations at the university. He found himself faced with the task of translating the passage from Homer describing the battle between Achilles and a sea-monster. Unfortunately, the word used for "sea-monster" is a rare one and the student had not come across it previously. So he wrote a spirited account of Achilles struggling away on the sea-shore, dealing blows in all directions. But he was unable to say whom or what Achilles was struggling

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with; and, not unexpectedly he failed the examination. I am sometimes reminded of this when I listen to speeches made by the representative of the Soviet Union, and other like-minded representatives, describing the horrors of the arms race and the panoply of weapons built up by the Western alliance, copiously illustrated with quotations from speeches by Western statesmen. But there is never any mention of the "sea-monster". It takes at least two to make an arms race.

The Warsaw Pact is also a formidable and well-armed military alliance, and it seems, so far as I can see, to be organized on principles not dissimilar to those of NATO, if one reads some of the pronouncements on this subject. Only the other day, on 17 February, an article in the Soviet Army's newspaper Red Star said:

"Marxist/Leninists consider that the refusal by any socialist country to pool its efforts in the military sphere with other fraternal countries would constitute a gross abandonment of the principles of proletarian internationalism and that, for the reliable defence of the conquests of socialism, a military alliance of socialist States is necessary."

Further on, the article adds:

"The cardinal questions of the defence of these countries are reviewed by the Political Consultative Committee."

I repeat the words "Political Consultative Committee", because I am sure the Committee will agree that they have a familiar ring. But here the similarity ends. There is a vast amount of published information about NATO, but this is not the case with the Warsaw Pact. I am not suggesting that this degree of secrecy on the part of the Warsaw Pact is necessarily reprehensible -- they have their reasons and we have ours; but I do suggest that the difficulty of comparing NATO with the Warsaw Pact is appreciably increased by the secrecy in which the proceedings of the latter are shrouded.

There are of course other dissimilarities that can stand in the way of a rational assessment of the situation. Some of the criticisms directed at the Western alliance by the members of the Warsaw Pact seem to me, paradoxically, to arise because these members seem genuinely to expect relations between the Western allies to be conducted in the same way as they conduct their affairs. It might be easier for these particular negotiations if they were, if the most powerful member or members of the Western alliance felt that it were right, and if they

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were able, to impose their will without question and without public discussion on the less powerful members.

But question and discussion are an intimate part of relations among members of the Western Alliance. We believe that whatever its disadvantages in the short term -- and it is always possible for the representative of the Soviet Union to find some splendid quotation from a disgruntled Western politician to support his argument for the moment -- whatever the short term disadvantages, we believe that free discussion is a vital source of the strength and cohesion of our Alliance. The concept of the dignity and the sovereignty of all members of the Alliance -- and I repeat all members -- is one which we prize. I am not suggesting that it does not exist inside the Warsaw Pact; but it does seem to be interpreted in a different way, as one would expect in a group of nations practising a different internal political system where the emphasis is placed on tight central control. I am not criticizing this system; I am simply trying to point out the difference between the two.

I also see that my speech on 1 March (ENDC/PV.244) came in for some rough handling by the representative of Czechoslovakia when he spoke on 3 March (ENDC/PV.245, pp.46 et seq.). He seems to have taken exception to my quotation from his speech of 22 February (ENDC/PV.242, p.31). Mr. Cernik seemed to think that, when I drew attention to that part of his speech where he had pointed out, quite rightly, that a non-proliferation treaty is not intended to destroy military alliances, or to interfere with the internal affairs of these alliances, I was in some way trying to drive a wedge between members of the Warsaw Pact.

I should like to make it quite plain that this was not my intention. Anyone who has any substantial experience of this Conference must realize that to try to do this would be a fairly unproductive exercise if only because of the close solidarity and similarity of views shown in the speeches by the representatives of the countries concerned. I was simply trying to point out what seemed to me to be an internal contradiction in the totality of views expressed by members of the Warsaw Pact, a contradiction which of course I took to be inadvertent. I am sure that not only the representative of the Soviet Union but everyone around this table must agree with Mr. Cernik that the treaty we are struggling to achieve must not be

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drafted in such a way that it interferes with the legitimate activities and structure of existing alliances. This is a point of vital importance. But it goes without saying that such activities are acceptable only so long as they do not involve proliferation, since non-proliferation is what the treaty is about. I hope that what I have just said will remove any misunderstanding of what I meant in my last speech.

I should now like to look at the draft presented by the United States delegation (ENDC/152/Add.1). I hope that all members of the Conference will agree that the submission of these revised drafts of articles I, II and IV of the United States draft treaty does mark a significant step forward, and I should like to express my delegation's warm support for these revisions. They have clearly been drawn up in a spirit of flexibility and compromise in order to meet all reasonable criticisms and suggestions made in our Committee during the examination of the earlier draft.

I hope that the Soviet delegation will note with approval that in several respects changes have been made in order to follow the language of the draft submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/164). The prohibition of any increase in the total number of States having control of nuclear weapons is maintained; and the reference to associations of non-nuclear States which is now added to the draft seems to me to meet any anxiety which may have been felt that a situation might conceivably arise at some future time when an association of non-nuclear States could have acquired control of nuclear weapons without infringing the treaty as it was drafted earlier. This possibility has now been closed.

Perhaps the most intractable problem with which we are faced is to find a way to prevent proliferation in the context of associations of States without limiting the legitimate right to associate. The definition of "control" in article IV of the new draft provides a firm barrier against proliferation in a mixed alliance of nuclear and non-nuclear States; and I have already underlined the importance of this vital definition which forms the hub of the framework of the Western draft. The other provisions of the treaty radiate from this firm, fixed point. The representative of the United States has given a comprehensive account of the reasoning behind this new formulation; and I shall only repeat at this stage that my delegation welcomes and supports it and I would commend it to the close attention of the other delegations here.

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If I may say so without seeming to engage in special pleading, I would especially ask that the eight delegations of governments which do not belong to either of the main military alliances should remove from their minds any natural and understandable repugnance to military alliances as such, which might make it more difficult for them to make a dispassionate judgement of the solution to the problem of proliferation which has been put forward this morning. As I have said before, until we can do away with the threats that have caused a significant proportion of the nations of the world to form alliances, these alliances will continue to exist; and I believe that the increase in confidence between all countries, the spirit of pride of achievement that would follow the signing of a sound treaty on non-proliferation, will help to bring closer a world where alliances are no longer necessary and in which, if I may use an expression that is perhaps more familiar in another context, they will wither away. But exactly the opposite consequences will flow from any attempt to use these negotiations here to try to sap the strength and damage the integrity of the alliances that now exist.

I should like to say a few words now on a different aspect of non-proliferation. A good deal has been heard of the feeling that the sacrifices made by the non-nuclear Powers in renouncing nuclear weapons should be counter-balanced by undertakings on the part of the existing nuclear Powers to reduce their own stocks of nuclear weapons. This seems to me to be a not unreasonable demand. Indeed, without going into the question of what sort of steps should become possible after the signing of a non-proliferation treaty, there are steps we can take here and now and put into effect without even waiting for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

One of these is President Johnson's plan for a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of delivery vehicles (ENDC/120) and his assurance that --

"If progress can be made here, the United States will be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles." (ENDC/165, p.3)

As the representative of the United States pointed out last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.248, p.9), had this proposal been promptly adopted in 1964, present United States inventories of nuclear delivery vehicles in the category of which we are talking would be only half what they are today. I would be very interested to hear whether the same would have been the case for the Soviet Union's inventories of nuclear delivery

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vehicles. But my main point here is to ask, does not this fact show the importance and the lasting value of adopting this measure of freeze and reduction as soon as possible?

This is not the only such proposal that the United States delegation has laid before this Committee. My colleagues will recall the intervention of the United States representative on 8 March (ENDC/PV.246, pp.33 et seq.) in which he explained how thousands of nuclear warheads could be destroyed and the fissile material they contained diverted to peaceful purposes. This is not, as Mr. Tsarapkin evidently believes, an insignificant "gimmick" attached to the former United States proposal for a cut-off on the production of fissile material. The United Kingdom attaches special importance to the destruction aspect of both this proposal and the earlier proposal for a freeze; and we can only feel disappointment at the frigid response which these proposals have been given by the Soviet Union, because, in our view, they are directed towards what is practicable and realizable.

Just as in our discussions on non-proliferation there is, I think, a wide awareness of the need to halt further proliferation so as then to proceed to restrict what has been called existing proliferation, so here too it seems to me to be a logical sequence to tackle production facilities for nuclear weapons in the hope that this can be a prelude to limiting and reducing existing nuclear weapons. There may be, it is true, differing interpretations about what constitutes balanced reductions; but no one, I hope, questions the need for proceeding in such a way and at such a speed as to preserve the existing military balance and stability. It is our belief, as I have said before, that even now -- at this moment -- the peace and stability of the world could be assured with substantially fewer nuclear weapons than now make up the enormous armouries of East and West.

Having dealt with the real possibilities for progress that I think are offered by these proposals, I should now like to say a brief word about security assurances. In practice it is clear that States that are members of alliances which include a nuclear Power can already count on the protection of that Power's nuclear weapons if their security should be threatened by nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack. It is rather the non-aligned States which feel themselves to be at a permanent disadvantage by signing a treaty promising not to acquire nuclear weapons. As my Prime Minister recently made clear in a speech he made in Edinburgh on 12 March, we are deeply sympathetic towards the concern felt by the non-aligned countries over this problem. He said:

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"Countries on the brink of making their own nuclear weapons will not be dissuaded unless those of us who have the power to do so join to give them some guarantees that they will not be under attack from their neighbours."

The President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union have each suggested possible solutions. I believe, myself, that it is for the countries on the receiving end to reflect on how best their legitimate needs can be met and to inform the Conference accordingly at an appropriate moment. I do not wish to urge the non-aligned States to produce an immediate formula. It may well be better to leave this very important point until a later stage in the negotiations when the final shape of a non-proliferation treaty has become clear.

The other principal subject which comes under the heading of measures related to a non-proliferation treaty is the comprehensive test ban. I think we all agree that progress in this field would substantially contribute to the effective operation of a non-proliferation treaty, quite apart from its impact on the arms race among the nuclear Powers. It is for this reason that my Government fully endorses the need for a comprehensive test ban with adequate, effective and agreed means of verification. Perhaps I might recall to the Committee the work conducted in the United Kingdom on the seismological aspects of this problem, about which I spoke on 3 February (ENDC/PV.237). We must look carefully at all possible lines of approach and, as I have said before, we should certainly pay careful attention to the various suggestions made by the non-aligned members of this Committee.

Since I last spoke about this, further interesting suggestions have been made by the representative of Sweden (ENDC/PV.243) and Mexico (ENDC/PV.246). Mrs. Myrdal developed in some detail certain aspects of the idea of inspection by challenge which had been earlier set out in New York by the Swedish permanent representative to the United Nations; and, as I had occasion to say earlier (ENDC/PV.237, pp.7,8), under this type of arrangement there would be an equal obligation to explain both on the accused and on the accuser. For his part, the representative of Mexico suggested that one contributory factor in an agreement might be the creation of a panel of scientists drawn from non-aligned countries who would undertake inspection (ENDC/PV.246, p.9). I do not want on this occasion to discuss the relative merits

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of these or other proposals, but only to observe that they testify to the existence of a widespread desire to explore in a constructive spirit the areas of difference over a comprehensive test-ban treaty; and I believe that this in itself is a hopeful sign.

In emphasizing the value these three measures would have, and their importance in the context of a non-proliferation treaty, I should also like to repeat my view, in which I think I am far from alone, that we should not try to link these directly to a non-proliferation treaty. We should not, I am convinced, make progress on one measure conditional on progress on another. Least of all should we do this over a non-proliferation treaty, the achievement of which is so urgent and vital to us all. If we tried to do this, we should risk achieving nothing but deadlock.

At this crucial stage in our proceedings when we have two draft treaties before us and yet when each month that passes increases the danger of the spread of nuclear arms, it really is up to us all to search our own minds as to how much importance we attach to the signing of a non-proliferation treaty. If we want it, we ought to be prepared on all sides to make sacrifices for it. If we do not want it, we might as well save our breath and discuss something else. I can assure the Committee that my Government believes -- and I quote again from my Prime Minister's speech on 12 March -- that "There is one challenge above all others in this vital year in world affairs. This is the urgent need to stop the spread of nuclear weapons".

As I have talked a good deal about alliances today and their relevance to the control of nuclear weapons, it might be as well if I were to end by adding to my Prime Minister's words and making the position of my Government absolutely clear. We have no blind faith in the permanent sanctity of alliances; we have no wish to preserve the so-called independence of the nuclear weapons that are now under our control. In the search for really effective international agreements on arms control and disarmament -- and especially those agreements that will prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons -- we are prepared to review our attitude to military alliances and our policies on nuclear weapons. We are not prepared to weaken our collective defences or erode our own national security; no responsible government could contemplate that. But we realize that in the end the only real security for any of us lies in a world from which the menace of nuclear weapons and eventually the threat of war itself have been permanently removed.

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As I have said, we expect no "instant disarmament". We realize that disarmament and the solution of the fundamental political problems of the world must go forward hand-in-hand. But if we could be certain of full agreement among the nations of the world on even the first small steps along the road -- agreements to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to put an end to all testing of these weapons -- we should be ready for our part to go a long way to remove any real obstacles that lie in our path. In a situation like the one in which we find ourselves today, it is clear that if we are to resolve the conflict of interests that stands between us and these urgently-needed disarmament agreements, it can be done only if everyone involved is prepared to make concessions and to take what might seem to be political and military risks. Provided that it is not expected to do so alone, my Government is prepared to make those concessions and to take those risks.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): As this is the first time that this delegation has addressed the Committee since its resumption on 27 January, I should like to emphasize that our silence should not be construed as a lack of interest in or apathy towards the discussions that have now been going on for some weeks. We are ready to contribute to the negotiations to the extent of our capabilities.

Needless to say, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, in the light of the realities that we face and the dangers inherent in both existing and future proliferation, is an urgent -- if not the most important -- issue with which this Committee now has to deal. The first round of our discussions has witnessed a deeper probing into the problems that we must overcome and has been characterized by a full and frank exchange of views on all sides. It not only has shown the sincerity and seriousness of all of us who are here, but also has reflected the concern in this problem of the international community at large, to which we are responsible by virtue of the mandate given to us by resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly (ENDC/161).

The Committee has now resumed its discussion of the non-proliferation issue which was interrupted over two weeks ago. During that interval we have had the benefit of discussion on other collateral measures and on the question of general and complete disarmament, which we had not discussed for over eighteen months. We hope that the two weeks of respite have given representatives time to reflect on what has been said by all sides, and that this will introduce fresh ideas and renewed enthusiasm into our discussions here.

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What we are about to say is in the nature of a general outline of some of the thoughts that have entered our minds in listening to the very valuable and interesting statements made by all delegations. My delegation feels it is first necessary to give our general impression if we are to participate in the detailed examination of the draft treaties.

This delegation has welcomed the respective draft treaties from the very time of their presentation. In this respect, the Burmese delegation in its statement to the First Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly said:

"We welcome the United States draft treaty of 17 August 1965 as well as the Soviet Union draft treaty of 24 September 1965 and look upon them as manifestations of the genuine desire and will to reach agreement on the part of the two Powers. We hope that there will be mutual concession and accommodation and that negotiations will be conducted with a complete absence of the desire to gain an advantage or cause disadvantage of any kind. In view of the urgency the Assembly will expect neither party to insist that its draft should become the exclusive basis for negotiations, but that the two Powers will be able to agree on a new common text using both drafts as a basis." (A/C.1/PV.1365,p.37)

Despite the fact that the major obstacle between the authors of the United States draft (ENDC/152) and the Soviet Union draft (ENDC/164), respectively, is reflected in the first two articles of those drafts, an examination of the remaining articles leads us to conclude that the two drafts have much in common, which reflects the desire of their sponsors to work out a practicable treaty.

We wish to point out that both draft treaties have attempted to deal with only one aspect of proliferation: the reaching of an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon countries. But it is common knowledge that it would not be in the interest of the nuclear Powers to indulge in indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear weapons to those nations that do not possess them, or to give such nations assistance in their manufacture. The main danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional States therefore lies not so much in the acquisition of such weapons from external sources as in the existence of a growing number of States with nuclear weapon potentialities.

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No doubt a formal agreement between the nuclear Powers not to disseminate nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States -- which they would not do in any case -- would in itself be an achievement that would have a salutary effect. But would that alone be sufficient inducement for the non-nuclear States, especially those with nuclear weapon capabilities, to subscribe to the agreement? Much will therefore depend not only on the degree of urgency with which the super-Powers settle the outstanding differences between them, but also and to a large extent on indications which they give that attempts are being made to limit, reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons should not be considered to be a sacred trust -- a virtue if possessed by some but immoral if acquired by others. We say this because of our position as what the representative of Sweden has described as a definitely non-nuclear weapon country, so that mutually-acceptable conditions for an agreement may be found, satisfying especially those countries whose adherence is essential if the treaty is to be effective.

Before proceeding further with my statement, I wish to join other non-aligned delegations which have referred to General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). We share their conviction that this mandate given to us by the United Nations circumscribes the extent of the area which we must explore if we are to achieve a fair and equitable treaty acceptable to all.

Our discussions have been focussed on operative paragraph 2 (b) of this resolution, which states: "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". (ENDC/161) Interpretations vary as to the nature of the obligations to be assumed by the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear Powers under the terms of that paragraph. What we should bear in mind is that our purpose is to contain the virus of nuclear infection which is now endangering the security of all States, large and small alike. The treaty is therefore unique in the sense that it is the first essential step required to stem the tide of nuclear holocaust that is threatening to engulf this world of ours, and is not an instrument to balance the particular vested interests of this or that group of nations. If we bear this in mind, we shall not be deflected from our path of achieving an acceptable balance of responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike.

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Some guiding principles as to what this balance should be may be found in the following much-quoted sentence from the Joint Memorandum of the non-aligned delegations:

"The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."

(ENDC/158)

Because of the very dissimilarity of the positions of the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers, the obligations to be assumed by them could not possibly be equal. But we feel that it would not be asking too much of the nuclear Powers to request them, at least as a start, to show some evidence that efforts are being made to take the first essential steps to inhibit the quantitative and qualitative enhancement of their nuclear arsenals.

An undertaking on the part of the non-nuclear weapon Powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons would in effect mean forgoing the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and such production is the first essential step for the manufacture of these weapons and constitutes an important dividing line between restraint from and pursuit of the nuclear path. An undertaking on the part of the major nuclear Powers to halt the production of fissionable materials of weapons grade would mean the cutting-off of additional supplies. In any case they already have large stocks, and any increase in quantities of fissionable material for weapons purposes could only be of diminishing, marginal value. Thus in this case the obligations to be undertaken by the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike would be identical. The sacrifice by the nuclear Powers would be marginal. However, the restraint required from the non-nuclear States would be substantial.

The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is also an essential requirement for the principle of balance. For the non-nuclear Powers the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) has the same de facto result as a non-proliferation measure while the nuclear Powers continue to test underground to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons. We venture to say that the intrinsic value of the comprehensive test-ban agreement would be greater than that of the halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, since adherence to it by

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the nuclear Powers would mean a nuclear cease-fire in their race to find the ultimate weapon. Success in finding such a weapon would result in the disturbance of the present balance of deterrence which could spell disaster for the security of the world. We therefore share the conviction of other non-aligned delegations that agreements on the cut-off of the production of fissionable material of weapons grade and on a comprehensive test-ban treaty are the least that should be expected from the nuclear Powers as evidence of their sincerity and determination to deal with the intra-national aspects of proliferation.

We therefore feel that these related measures should be discussed concurrently, on a basis of equal urgency, with the non-proliferation issue. We do not see why, given the political will, the entry into force of these related measures could not be achieved together with measures on non-proliferation. But however much we may wish to link these measures, their solutions could not possibly be interrelated. A corollary that can be drawn from this is: if solutions are found to the non-proliferation issue, which is the main aspect of our problem, would it be practicable for us to wait for the solution of other related measures? In other words, should all these measures be implemented simultaneously, or should they be dealt with within a certain stipulated period?

If we take the latter approach, a non-proliferation treaty could possibly include a separate article in which the nuclear Powers would assume specific commitments concerning their intention to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals and their delivery vehicles. The treaty with an indefinite duration could contain a stipulation on the lines of article VI of the United States draft treaty providing that it would be subject to periodic review. If, at the time of the treaty review, there should be any evidence of a breach of good faith concerning this special article, a juridical assessment could be made on the right of withdrawal.

Our thoughts in this matter were inspired to a certain degree by the suggestions made by the representative of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.245, pp.10, 11); but they are by no means intended to be considered as definitive proposals. The statements made by the non-aligned delegations as well as by other delegations show that in this complex problem there are more ways than one to stem the tide of proliferation. A deeper exploration of the problem would perhaps reward us with the most practical formula

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or a composite of formulas enabling us to arrive at an equitable agreement acceptable to the international community at large, nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike.

We should now like to express some thoughts on the principles embodied in operative paragraph 2 (a) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). This paragraph states:

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form."

The aim of this paragraph, as we interpret it, is to foreclose all possible means of leakage of nuclear weapons to new entities and to see that no limitations are placed on preventing all such possibilities. When controversies arise as to what constitutes a watertight non-proliferation treaty, should not the text be favoured that tries to close all possible avenues, to prevent proliferation in every sense of the word? In this respect we appreciate the amendments (ENDC/152/Add.1) submitted today by the United States with the purpose of introducing more precise language into its draft treaty. These amendments merit careful study by this Committee. Some of our thoughts on this matter were expressed as long ago as 1963, when the Burmese representative stated in the First Committee during the eighteenth session of the General Assembly:

"... my delegation is bound to say that it views with grave concern the project designed to produce a multilateral nuclear force comprising certain countries of the NATO alliance. However laudable may be the hopes and intentions of its sponsors, we fear that its eventual result will only be to pass control over nuclear weapons to those who do not today possess them". (A/C.1/PV.1326, p. 31)

The question of ensuring security is an indispensable element in a non-proliferation treaty. We are receptive to any effective guarantee against nuclear attack that would not compromise our standing as a non-aligned country. For that reason we had given our support to the idea advanced by the representative of Nigeria that --

"An indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is ... a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not

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to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers ... or to threaten to use them." (A/C.1/PV.1356; ENDC/PV.235, p.31).

We were therefore encouraged by the offer in the recent message from Premier Kosygin to this Committee (ENDC/167) which declared the willingness of the Soviet Government to include in the treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territory. This offer merits elaboration by its sponsors and exploration by the nuclear Powers with a view to achieving a mutually-agreed offer of guarantee which would induce a sense of security particularly in those non-nuclear States which, by the very nature of their non-alignment, are wary of seeking shelter under any sphere of nuclear protection.

We also are in favour of the suggestion for strengthening United Nations security arrangements contained in the recent message addressed to this Committee by President Johnson (ENDC/165). Strengthening the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and to thwart aggression in any form whatsoever, whether conventional or nuclear, is also an essential factor that could go a long way towards strengthening the security of smaller nations.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): We shall now continue our discussion on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation would like to express its point of view on the basic task for the fulfilment of which the Eighteen-Nation Committee was created: the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

If we all agree that the principal danger consists in the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear-missile war, then it is quite logical that we should also agree that, within the complex of general and complete disarmament, those proposals and measures which would lead in the shortest possible time to the elimination of the means of unleashing and conducting such a war should be at the centre of our attention. It is not coincidental, therefore, that in the course of discussions on the questions of general and complete disarmament our Committee has concentrated its attention on this crucial question.

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Unfortunately, however, as a result of the positions taken up by the Western Powers, these discussions are now at a deadlock, and we are faced with the fact that since the end of 1964 neither the Eighteen-Nation Committee nor the United Nations General Assembly has considered this basic problem of disarmament. Mere declarations that the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament remains the principal task of our Committee cannot conceal the fact that the discussion of questions of general and complete disarmament has, through the fault of the West, reached a deadlock, and that the Western Powers are clearly not interested in changing this state of affairs.

The Czechoslovak delegation therefore considers it proper that our Committee has now again entered upon the consideration of the existing situation of discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and that it is seeking ways of making progress on this basic question of disarmament. We are indeed summoned to this task by resolution 2031 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161), which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States Members and which requests us to continue our efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The socialist delegations have pointed out more than once that the basic reason why our negotiations have not so far produced any results is the general approach of the Western Powers to the question of disarmament. Although the Western Powers have paid lip-service to the idea of general and complete disarmament, their actions are not directed to the realization of that aim but, on the contrary, are diametrically opposed to the very essence of the disarmament idea. The approach of the Western Powers, both to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and to proposals regarding collateral measures, is based on their efforts to subordinate disarmament to their military and strategic concepts, which amount in substance to a desire to retain permanently the ability to conduct a nuclear-missile war.

How can the Western Powers, and particularly the United States of America be interested in a real solution of the problem of disarmament if every year they expand their military output, raise the numbers of their armed forces and establish

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new military bases? The war in South-East Asia which the United States is conducting against the Viet-Nameese people, and the military intervention of the United States in Latin America and Africa, clearly show in what direction United States foreign policy is moving. That policy, which is essentially the "position of strength" policy condemned by all nations, is being increasingly influenced by military circles. So long as the trend of foreign policy of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United States, remains unchanged, the discussion in our Committee of the questions of general and complete disarmament will be at a standstill.

The approach of the Socialist States towards solving the problem of general and complete disarmament is determined by their desire to achieve radical progress in our negotiations as quickly as possible. In striving for general and complete disarmament the socialist countries, and first and foremost the Soviet Union, have done much to adapt their proposals to the demands of the other States taking part in these negotiations. It was the Soviet Union itself which took into account the views of the Western Powers and agreed to a substantial modification of its original draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2), thus furnishing new evidence that the socialist States are endeavouring to create an appropriate basis for agreement.

The most important step in this direction was the proposal regarding retention of the so-called "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), since it had a decisive bearing on the key area of general and complete disarmament -- that is, on questions relating to the means of delivering nuclear weapons and to the weapons themselves. This proposal was supported by most of the delegations of non-aligned States which are members of our Committee as an appropriate basis for further negotiations. The essence of the proposal for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" is the endeavour to eliminate as soon as possible the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. This proposal was distinguished above all by its balance. Its implementation would give no advantage to either side. And we were dealing here with a radical and realistic measures which could have rescued the negotiations on general and complete disarmament from the present stalemate and become the starting-point for other steps in the same direction.

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But despite the efforts of the socialist delegations, and chiefly those of the Soviet Union delegation, which gave an exhaustive explanation of its proposal and suggested that it should be discussed in more detail by a working party (ENDC/PV.188, p.17), further negotiations were held up by the negative attitude of the Western Powers. It was precisely from the Western Powers that opposition was encountered to the principle of a "nuclear umbrella", which represents a step taken by the Soviet Union towards bringing its position and that of the Western Powers closer together, and which meets their demand that in the process of disarmament additional guarantees should be provided for the security of individual States. Behind the various trumped-up arguments against the "nuclear umbrella" lay the Western Powers' reluctance to agree to radical measures which would remove the threat of nuclear war at the very beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament.

On the other hand, the United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) convinces us that the United States is interested first and foremost in retaining as long as possible such a level of nuclear power as could be used at any time for nuclear blackmail or intimidation and, in the end, for the conduct of nuclear war. This is indicated also, incidentally, by the collateral measures which the United States and its allies are now trying to push through instead of general and complete disarmament: that is, the proposals for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the freezing of strategic means of delivery (ENDC/120) -- measures which do not affect the existing colossal potential of destructive weapons capable of unleashing a nuclear conflict.

There is no need to prove that the United States plan for freezing the production of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them is not in any sense a disarmament measure; it can hardly, therefore, be associated with the first stage of general and complete disarmament, as was attempted by Mr. Fisher, the United States representative on 15 March. The term "non-armament", proposed by him in connexion with this plan (ENDC/PV.248, p.10), is much nearer to reality. Naturally, "non-armament", at the existing level of nuclear-weapon stocks, again means nothing but the retention and fixation of the ability to use these weapons in a nuclear war.

As for the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear armaments in the process of general and complete disarmament, the delegations of the socialist countries have already proved in the previous discussion that such a measure is unacceptable; and on the basis of a detailed analysis they have shown that such a reduction would not ensure equal security for all States. At the same time it would actually leave open, throughout the process of general and complete disarmament, the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war. That this opinion of ours is correct was, we think, again proved by the statement of the United States representative at the 248th meeting, when he gave actual figures for the stocks of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles held in the United States (ibid., p.9). These figures clearly showed that with the existing stocks of these weapons it would be possible to unleash a nuclear war even at the third stage of disarmament, and even if there was a percentage reduction of nuclear armaments in accordance with the United States' proposal.

The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament takes as its starting-point an evaluation of the present situation, which is characterized by the existence of colossal quantities of the means of mass destruction; and for this reason it puts nuclear disarmament first. The socialist States repeat again -- and this view had found exact expression in the Soviet draft -- that the basic substance of general and complete disarmament should be the carrying out of such measures as will in the shortest time eliminate the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear-missile war.

In accordance with this need, the Soviet Union proposed for the very first stage of general and complete disarmament the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons (except those which would be retained as the "nuclear umbrella"), the elimination of foreign bases and the withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territories. The result of the elimination of the means of delivery would be the practical neutralization of nuclear weapons, and this in turn would considerably facilitate agreement on their elimination. However, the removal of the threat of nuclear war can also be brought about by the elimination of nuclear weapons themselves in the first stage, or the simultaneous elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The socialist States have expressed their agreement to all these alternatives; but the Western Powers maintain their refusal to enter upon the only correct path, the path which leads to real disarmament while safeguarding the security of all States.

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Although the socialist States, in the matter of general and complete disarmament give preference to nuclear disarmament, this does not at all mean that they ignore the other aspects of general and complete disarmament. Conventional armaments also have their place in the Soviet draft, which specifically calls for a reduction in the total numbers of armed forces. In the sector of control, too, the Soviet plan is fully balanced, since all control measures correspond to the level of the disarmament measures adopted, and leave no room for the misuse of control for other purposes.

In the discussion of general and complete disarmament the socialist States have repeatedly endeavoured to bring the position of the sides closer together; and in the interests of achieving agreement they have made considerable concessions to the Western delegations. In this their sole aim was to restart the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, which had come to a standstill owing to the Western Powers' intractability. Today we repeat again that we are willing to agree to all realistic proposals concerning the manner in which our Committee should proceed in the negotiations for concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The socialist States once more call upon the Western Powers to refrain from obstructing the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, so that progress can be made in our work in accordance with the appeal contained in resolution 2030 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161). The Czechoslovak delegation, together with the delegations of the other socialist States, is prepared to do everything in its power to ensure the success of our negotiations for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, since that is exactly what is expected of us by the peoples who have empowered us to conduct negotiations on a problem of such great importance to the destiny of mankind.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The recent meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have shown once again how substantial are the differences between the position of the majority of the world's States and the position of the Powers members of NATO on the question of general and complete disarmament. In the one case it is actually disarmament that is being talked of: a state of international relations in which, despite the existence of unresolved or disputed issues, not a single State or group of States could wage war for the simple reason that it would not have the physical means of fighting. In the other case,

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as the statements by the delegations of the United States and Canada in particular have shown, something else is involved.

If in a speech on the subject of general and complete disarmament, made four years after the Eighteen-Nation Committee began its work, the destruction of obsolete weapons or measures that are obviously palliative are proposed, we are entitled to raise the question: But where does disarmament come in? Is it difficult to answer such questions, for example, as the following: when the guillotining of all B-47 bombers is completed this year, will the United States no longer have the means of continuing its aggression against the Viet-Namese people; will it or will it not be in a position to wage a war; and will the danger of a nuclear war or even an accident like that at Almeria disappear?

It is not difficult to answer these questions. The replacement of obsolete weapons by improved ones will obviously not only not diminish, but will, on the contrary, increase, the danger of war. Furthermore, we believe that anyone who proposes to "disarm" by destroying obsolete weapons does not contemplate disarmament and does not yet want it, and is diverting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the execution of its main task. This is the source of all the difficulties with which the Committee has been faced throughout the four years of its work. This is also why its work has not produced results.

The question may be put, whether the position of those who unremittingly support the idea of general and complete disarmament and look upon it as an entirely feasible task is actually unrealistic. Perhaps only naive dreamers can speak at present of disarmament in face of the military escalation for which the United States is responsible in the course of its uncereimonious interference in the affairs of other peoples.

Meanwhile, without going far back into history, and taking only the last eighteen months since the impasse which the Eighteen-Nation Committee reached in 1964, one can draw attention to the following. At Cairo in October 1964 the representatives of 47 non-aligned States decided to propose the convening of a world disarmament conference (A/5763); meeting in New York in June 1965, the United Nations Disarmament Commission arrived at the same idea and called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to seek out ways to disarmament (DC/225;ENDC/149); at the end of 1965 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the well-known resolution 2030 (XX) (ENDC/162) concerning the convening of the aforementioned

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world disarmament conference not later than 1967; the General Assembly expressed the wish that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would increase its efforts to draw up a draft treaty on disarmament (A/RES/2031(XA); ENDC/161). It is well known how those documents were adopted -- either unanimously or by an overwhelming majority of States. These, then, are people who desire general and complete disarmament under strict international control and obviously consider such an aim accessible; for otherwise why turn to our Committee, or propose that all States should meet if they were going to waste time, effort and money on mere talk?

All international decisions on questions of general and complete disarmament are in fact based on two historically-justified considerations: first, the conviction that mankind's passage from the age of wars to a state of lasting peace can be ensured only by the destruction of weapons, and that in modern conditions this is necessary for the very existence of human civilization; and second, a sober appraisal of the growth of those forces which, embodied in the vast majority of States, are interested in the maintenance of peace and are therefore able to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of disarmament, and thus make the aim of disarmament realistic.

The Committee's documents present a complete picture of the monstrous arms race and the level of military preparedness reached by existing military groupings. We know of the thousands of millions of dollars spent annually by the States members of NATO alone to support an army of six million. We know what quantities of nuclear warheads have been accumulated, their destructive capacity, the possibilities of delivering them to any target, and the time needed for this. The human and material losses which would be caused by a thermo-nuclear war in the very first hours of military operations, if it ever came to that, can be accurately predicted and enumerated. The principal conclusion can therefore be drawn unerringly: such a turn of events must be prevented; a third world war must be rendered absolutely impossible; above all, the use of nuclear weapons must be ruled out. All this is provided for by the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2) which was submitted at the very outset of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work.

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This draft has not lost and will not lose its topicality, despite all the attempts to discredit it which we have again been witnessing in the last few days. It is well known that the USSR, the other socialist countries and a number of non-aligned States have at various times made proposals aimed at bringing the positions of the sides closer together. A very important step towards accommodating the wishes of the Western countries was made by the Soviet Government when it proposed the retention until the end of the disarmament process of an agreed minimum number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- what is customarily called the "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). And now we hear the USSR being reproached with inconsistency! Some did not perceive in this Soviet proposal a desire to reach agreement and a readiness for reasonable compromises for the sake of success on the main issue; they saw inconsistency in the conduct of the Soviet and other socialist delegations but forgot that the destruction of nuclear weapons at the initial stage was proposed by another State, allied to the Western countries, and that the idea of the "nuclear umbrella" was also first raised in the Western allies' camp.

At any rate, we are convinced that the majority of the delegations here present correctly see in the Soviet draft treaty on disarmament and the addenda submitted to it a good basis for successful negotiations. On the other hand, the "consistency" that is, the obstinacy of the Western delegations in defending the maximum retention of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, for an indefinite period -- demonstrates their reluctance to agree to disarmament now.

From whatever angle the Soviet draft treaty on disarmament is considered, it fully corresponds to the interests of all peoples and of all States. Its form and substance, its aim and the time-limits it proposes are such that the execution of the treaty would save mankind rapidly and for ever from the calamities of war. A particularly valuable feature of the Soviet draft is that it provides for the elimination of nuclear war on a world scale even before the process of complete disarmament is finished, thereby answering the imperative needs of present-day reality.

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Can the same be said about the United States draft on disarmament? It cannot. Let us take as an example the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons during the first two stages of disarmament (ENDC/30, p.4). It has been calculated that if this method of disarmament were adopted, the United States alone would have, six years after the beginning of disarmament, a fully adequate quantity of the strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons. From that time on, and for a still unknown period, a major nuclear war would be possible, just as the destruction of every living creature on earth would be possible. What kind of disarmament is that? In the "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" submitted by the United States, it is difficult to find any elements of real general disarmament as a means of ridding mankind of war.

First, the "Outline" does not fully correspond to the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), since essentially it does not go beyond the limits of partial disarmament. The scope of the disarmament provided for in the "Outline" does not correspond to the scope of the control measures.

Secondly, the most important disarmament measures are deferred to stage III, no final time-limit for which is indicated. At the same time, no satisfactory relationship is established between the rates at which missile weapons are to be reduced and the rates of liquidation of foreign military bases; and the limitation of the nuclear potential and armaments of States is also totally inadequate.

Thirdly, the "Outline" provides neither for the prohibition nor for the elimination of nuclear weapons within definite time-limits. Under the "Outline" the nuclear States will possess for an indefinite period in stage III a quantity of nuclear weapons and means of delivering them to their targets which, as has already been mentioned, would make it possible to wage nuclear war on a wide scale. And this would be after "disarmament"! Qualification and comment are unnecessary.

Our delegation has all the time been trying to interpret the words "in a peaceful world" contained in the title of the United States "Outline". We hoped that the United States delegation would dispel the legitimate and grave doubts suggested by those words in the "Outline" on disarmament and taking this form: the world is not at peace; it is faced with a number of unsolved problems; many problems are not settled in the way that the United States of America would like;

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all these problems should be settled to suit the wishes of the United States, if necessary after recourse to arms; when this has been done, then and only then will there be "a peaceful world"; then and then only will it be possible to apply the "Outline" definitively -- that is, to disarm.

Up to now the delegations of the United States and its allies have made only distant allusions to this problem -- exclamations to the effect that the socialist Powers' disarmament proposals go too far, or that hardly anyone would wish to renounce nuclear weapons today. We have now witnessed a more sincere statement: that the position of the Western Powers on questions of disarmament is connected with the presence in the modern world of social conflicts and national liberation movements which require the armed intervention of the West and thus prevent disarmament. If only history came to a halt and every progressive movement stopped dead, some representatives of the West would proceed to disarm. In the meantime, however, their subjective disinclination to disarm and thus ensure the peaceful settlement of all disputes is elevated to the status of an insurmountable objective obstacle to disarmament.

What is the actual state of the problem concerning the realism of the various disarmament proposals, and first and foremost of the proposals on nuclear disarmament? Were all the decisions regarding the necessity of disarmament, including the decision to set up the Eighteen-Nation Committee itself, nothing but shadow-boxing? Of course not. Apart from a recognition of the necessity and inevitability of disarmament, these decisions, as we said just now, are based on the conviction that our task is a realistic one. Is this proved by the discussions in the Committee? It is. Let us take the latest example from our recent meetings. The Soviet delegation was asked whether it believed that any States would be prepared to renounce nuclear weapons at a time when the Soviet Union itself was proposing nuclear disarmament first of all. How is this to be understood? It could only be understood as a desire to foist the responsibility for failure in the negotiations upon someone else.

Where are the objective, insurmountable reasons here? They do not exist. We have the subjective disinclination of the United States and their allies to renounce their "nuclear strategy", which is dangerous to all and therefore condemned by all. Perhaps we can find signs of the objective difficulties in the way of nuclear disarmament in the words of Mr. McNamara when he says that by 1967-71 the United States will have produced enough strategic rockets to give it more than

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enough power for -- I quote -- "destruction capability against both the Soviet Union and Communist China simultaneously" ^{1/}(US News and World Report, 7 February 1966). Clearly, disarmament is being prevented, not by insurmountable obstacles, but by the fact that the concept of the "containing force" has now developed into the "force of intimidation", or, to give it a more appropriate name, "nuclear blackmail".

We are deeply convinced that it is time to throw all these concepts into the dustbin of history, to cease thinking about destroying anyone at all, and to cease despising world opinion as crystallized in the United Nations resolutions condemning nuclear weapons and proposing an early solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. The core of this problem is nuclear disarmament, elimination of the possibility of nuclear conflict. All proposals to this end deserve serious consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

We therefore also find interesting the Swedish suggestion (ENDC/PV.202, p.10) that the proposed 'stages of disarmament should be considered one by one, beginning with the last. This would enable us clearly to define the aim we are striving for and the dates set for its achievement. At the same time we could solve all the questions of unlimited control, in complete accordance with the disarmament measures adopted -- a result which cannot be achieved where there are many collateral measures for which the required control is often not in accordance with the measures themselves.

Lastly, a review of the situations that would obtain in the final stage of disarmament would help to show how peace can be preserved until the time comes when attempts to violate it are a thing of the past. Each of the sides would describe in detail its idea of a disarmed world, and that of course would help to solve the whole problem. As soon as the Committee turns to the detailed consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament, our delegation will give its views on the subject again. Let us hope that the discussion of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament will not be delayed for long, and, in particular, that the consideration of measures to avert nuclear war will not be put off. The "little" catastrophe near Palomares has again reminded us of the great danger hanging over the whole world. It is incumbent on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament more than on any other body to pursue its task with all speed.

^{1/} Translated from Russian.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 250th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Vasile Dumitrescu, representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Burma, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

"The delegation of the United States submitted amendments (ENDC/152/Add.1) to the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on **Thursday**, 24 March 1966, at 9 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

